/sci/ - Science & Math

>>12414659
You can upload only a copy.

>>12416884
What do you think that would imply?

Felt bad so here's a bump

>>12417013
Here is a chart to make you feel better.

It doesn’t work bruh

>>12414659
Ever heard of the Moravec Transfer? At its basest form it is theory that the mind is a continious process and that only by preserving that process a ego transfer would be possible. The two known methods would be the gradual neuron replacement, a hijack of the neurogenesis process that exchanges natural brain cells with nanomachines, and the Mind Shift process. The latter is a bit more dubious as the Gradual Neuron Replacement occurs naturally already.
The mind shift works by utilizing external hardware and software connected directly and indirectly to the user's brain to allow a slow transfer of consciousness out of the biological substrate and into external databases. Imagine yourself getting additional brain matter but in digital form.
This could allow the user to "outsource" much of one's mentality and memory storage to external substrates which were separate from the sophont's own brain, until finally most of the sophont's thoughts, perceptions, memories, identity, etc. take place outside and away from the mass of grey matter the sophont initially came equipped with. The external hardware which gradually comes to hold more and more of the individual's personality is known as the exocortex, while the software which runs on this equipment is known as the Exoself. It could be possible to transfer bi-directionally most of a biont's extended consciousness by this method, since many of the most competent processes of intellect now occur outside the skull in the exocortex. The problem would be that you would have to revist every singular part of your mind in a total manner, such a task can only be accomplished if you have total self-awareness (autosentience) so that your analog part of your brain becomes redundant for the main processes, a loss of them would then affect your Ego the same as a stroke.

>>12417144
Where is the bottleneck?

>>12417211
Thanks that is a good post and it offers the opportunity to bring up a lot of points. I won't do it in one go.

I have read that non-destructive scanning has a couple of serious limitations:
>The movement of biological tissue, requiring either imaging faster than it can move or accurate tracking. In cats, the arterial pulse produces 110–266 μm movements lasting 330–400 ms and breathing larger (300–950 μm) movements (Britt and Rossi, 1982)24. The stability time is as short as 5‐20 ms.
• Imaging has to occur over a distance of >150 mm (the width of an intact brain) or be invasive.
• The imaging must not deposit enough energy (or use dyes, tracers or contrast enhancers) to hurt the organism.
• The method must not significantly alter the mental or neural state of the subject being scanned in order to avoid a possibly significant “observer effect” anomalies and false reading that could produce a flawed emulation model.

On gradual replacement:
>The technology needed to achieve it could definitely be used for scanning by disassembly. Gradual
replacement is therefore not likely as a first form of brain emulation scanning (though in practice it may eventually become the preferred method if non‐destructive scanning is not possible).

Don't feel like reading all this right now but it recently occured to me that you can probably avoid the sticky identity/consciousness issues that >>12416884 alluded to using a more gradual process of integration and expansion, slowly enhancing your mental faculties with connections to external processors a la Neuralink and allowing neuroplasticity to work it's magic and incorporate those external nodes into its own structure. Eventually your 'consciousness" is more in the machine than your own body.
Obviously questions remain but to me this seems like taking a "teleportation=death" problem and turning it into a Ship of Theseus problem.

>>12416884
Is the Moravec Transfer really so obscure?

>>12417343
For this, I think I will need to be summarizing some Chalmers and Searle in the upcoming replies.

>>12417348
As the transfer happens you continuously and slowly lose your consciousness until you're dead in the exact same way it would happen if you did it all at once.
The transfer isn't a solution.

>>12417392
>As the transfer happens you continuously and slowly lose your consciousness
But you don`t because neurogenesis occur all the time and even a large part of your brain can get healed back to functionality. At its basic anyone undergoing the Moravec Transfer has their meat brain replaced by a nanomachine one one brain cell at a time. At what point do you stop being Human, Moravec wondered: when the first neuron is silicised? (If so, say goodbye to everyone with a cochlear implant). When half the brain is gone? When the last organic neuron is swapped out? There's a continuity to this process that soothes my gut fears, that makes me realize that sure, if you change gradually – one neuron at a time – you'll never stop being human in any real sense. It can be done.

>>12417392
>>12417443
It isn't a solution because there isn't a problem. The only sense in which you continue being the same person is that you maintain memories and psychological continuity of your past self. That is all that is required to explain why you feel like you are the same person as you were yesterday. If there is such a state of consciousness that remembers being you, knows everything you know and has your personality then you survive, insofar you survive through the passage of time at all. Whether this is achieved via "gradual transfer" or destroy and copy makes no difference.

>>12414659
I have had two persistent thoughts in my life, from the beginning.

Start over from birth exactly as before but retain all accumulated knowledge and understanding.

AND CREATE A FULL SENSE SPECTRUM DREAM RECORDING SYSTEM. Yeah, I'm interested.

>>12417488
huh?

>>12417463
It makes a existential difference. If you teleport me by creating a clone that has all my memories and personality while my original self get evaporated, I wouldn't survive it because I am not my memories or my personality but my consciousness. There exists no bridge between my consciousness and some other consciousness just because it got a replica of my personality and memories. It is not me, pattern identity theory has this as its fundamental flaw. Externally it would be me, but internally I will be gone. A boltzmann construct of me is not me even if it has the same personality or memories, it is a different consciousness. If we really would accept PIT then any alteration of personality and memory would mean the internal death of the person but we know this to be not true as many amnesiacs still were the same consciousness and we change ourselves too but our internal view remains. I only see legitimacy with the continuity identity theory.

>>12417492
If someone figures out digital consciousness upgrade tech, all the heavy lifting is done. Recording dreams for review as though you are the original dreamer seems like latant functionality of that tech.

>>12417518
Define consciousness

>>12414659
Can’t be done in a digital computer. It would be a simulation of neurons firing (really it’s binary numbers moving around in a bus), not neurons actually firing.

You will need artificial neurons that act like biological neurons if you wanted a “machine brain”

>>12417530
>Define consciousness
Awareness of one's internal self. The ability to self-conceptualize oneself within the world. Failing at explaining what consciousness is.

>>12417527
>become immortal
>can travel the universe
>can learn everything that has ever been learned
>I record my dreams!

>>12417518
>I wouldn't survive it because I am not my memories or my personality but my consciousness.
How does it make sense to talk about those thing as if they existed independently and separately from each other? If consciousness that inhabited your body had been "destroyed" seconds ago but replaced with a perfect replica, you would feel exactly like you do now. This absolutist and non-reductionist sense of "self" does no explanatory work. Why assume it exists at all?

>If we really would accept PIT then any alteration of personality and memory would mean the internal death of the person but we know this to be not true as many amnesiacs still were the same consciousness and we change ourselves too but our internal view remains.
Why does it have to be so binary? In general with Ship of Theseus kind of situations we accept that there's no absolute matter of fact when there's enough change that the original object isn't left anymore. Likewise, at some point when alterations to memories and personality of individual are severe enough, I would say the original person no longer exists. They would cease to have any meaningful connection with the original person and wouldn't even identify it. When exactly? There doesn't need to be an absolute answer, any more than with Ship of Theseus.

>>12417621
>you would feel exactly like you do now.
No, because I wouldn´t feel anything at all. No consciousness inhabits my body but emerges as a byproduct of various interactions within the brain and body. The substrate may be gradually changed but the process must be kept to allow for it to exist.

this is a stealth qualia thread

>>12418513
You would feel exactly like you feel now whether your mind is an exact replica of someone else's mind or whether you *actually* were that person in the past. Therefore your absolutist notion of self doesn't explain anything about your conscious experience. It's based on nothing.

>>12418582
>You would feel exactly like you feel now
Externally yes, internally I would be gone. A replicia of something is not the original object, a pattern of a thing is not the thing itself. "I" am the same person as various future and past selves with whom I am structurally and temporally continuous and not a pattern. Only gradual uploading would fit in with the Thousand Brains Theory of Intelligence I agree with. The PIT skips a logical step when they propose that a time bridge exists me and a past or future replicia, they simply ignore the inner self. But you are not an eidolon.

>>12418598
>Externally yes, internally I would be gone.
By *you* I mean you first and foremost in the current moment. You would be the replica in this thought experiment. But you'd feel like you also were the "original person", just that according to your theory you would somehow be deluded in thinking so. Despite the replica having just as much access to the conscious states of the original person in the past as the "real continuation" would have had (hadn't he be "killed), the same memories, nothing more nothing less. Internally too a "real continuation" and a "fake continuation" (a replica) would feel the same.

>>12418627
>By *you* I mean you first and foremost in the current moment.
Consciousness is a muddy thing but I disagree with the notion that consciousness is only a thing of a day until sleeps kills it. It is a emergent product and as long as the substrate potential from which it orginates remains, it is the same consciousness. It is likely that our consciousness is a divided thing, brain and left are two minds operating as one and we may have additional conscious divisions.
>Despite the replica having just as much access to the conscious states of the original person in the past
But it doesn`t. The memory of a thing is not the thing in itself. Their substrates are not connected with each other, no bridge exists between the two.
Fundamentally, there needs to be "bidirectional" thought for any transfer in order to preserve ego continuity. If we imagine a mind as like water or some fluid, and the brain as a vessel for it, then just "pouring" the mind into a new vessel doesn't preserve continuity; the new mind in the new vessel can't communicate back to old mind in the old vessel.
However, if we consider simply connecting the two vessels and siphoning the mind from one to the other (at whatever speed) while the new mind can talk to the old mind as the latter is transferred to the former, then continuity is maintained and death does not occur.

>>12418650
>The memory of a thing is not the thing in itself.
That is exactly my point. You are not strictly speaking the same person you were moments ago because you do not have access to the exact conscious state at that time. You only have a memory. And a replica would have the same memory.

I'm curious, do you consider it inconceivable and metaphysically impossible in any possible world for a person to diverge into two equally legit continuations (that are nonetheless separate after diverging), like a road diverging in two directions symmetrically, or are these views more about the specific thought experiments were there's some apparent asymmetry (like one guy having also bodily continuity and the other being a digital copy).

>>12418689
>You are not strictly speaking the same person you were moments ago
That depends on your definition on personhood. The underlying structure and substrate of the individual personhood remains the same and while you will never be able to experience the same state again, you will experience a set of experience again and again. Our minds are divided in a conscious part, in a subconscious and a unconscious part who emerge from the workings of a thousand different sub-nodes of the brain. As far as I understand you, you are saying that consciousness is only exists for moments at the time and that a repetition of that pattern would be it again. I disagree with that pattern theory, if another mind-substrates somehow gets access of your memory and personality, that wouldn`t mean that your mind-substrate would survive it or even that your memories or personality would as the substrate of that new mind-substrate is different one from yours.
>I'm curious, do you consider it inconceivable and metaphysically impossible in any possible world for a person to diverge into two equally legit continuations
Externally no, internally yes. To keep your consciousness you have to keep your process ongoing. We are not a road, our mind opperates far more inter-connected and is not a static thing.

>>12414659
>>12417211
>>12417518
>>12418718
>>12418650
If identity is a non-physical information pattern, then something profoundly different must be occurring during replication, there is a proposal called the Branching theory of identity.

Branching identity argues that it is a prejudice to grant the subjective POV of the mind associated with the brain greater importance than the POV of the mind associated with the WBE when judging identity status.

Branching identity - an alternative theory of personal identity premised on: Identity relying exclusively on psychological, nonphysical properties; Identity having no physical traits beyond the association with physical systems (brains or computers) that instantiate an identity's salient information patterns
(In the philosophy of realism, the association of an abstract type with a physical exemplar is called occurrence or tokenization)

According to branching identity, all descendant minds of a common ancestral mind have equal primacy in their claim to the original identity.

Branching identity: respects the POV claims of all people (minds) involved; avoids bias, prejudice, and discrimination; avoids certain unfalsifiable phenomena; avoids many seemingly unnecessary additional properties: unmotivated quantum mechanical physical to metaphysical Bridges; unmotivated continuity streams; arbitrary consciousness and neural activity thresholds; categorically erroneous spatial location and motion traits; arbitrary replacement distance and rate thresholds

>>12414659
>>12418913
How might WBE fail to preserve identity:
1)imperfect emulation - perfect QM emulation before considering ident preservation a possibility
2)continuity streams: stream of conscious experience; stream of basal neural activity
3)spatial relocation

1) some people who require QM precision believe MU is feasible if their QM precision req is satisfied - this is impossible due to the Heisenberg uncertainty principle
no evidence that psych characteristics rely on QM minutia of neurophysiology
to the contrary brains are subject to ceaseless deviations and damage (small and large): radon (in the air), cosmic rays, medical X-rays, etc. Also, neurons die on a reg basis.

Another argument against QM identity is to consider fMRI which is a QM technology (magnetically manipulates some QM states in the brain)

2)A stream of conscious experience
our consciousness is subject to various forms of reduction: sleep, fainting, general anesthesia, rapid frigid drowning - we don’t regard these as identity vanishing. This arguments often leads to another objection: 2)B

3)One stance is that since the brain replaces its material components metabolically (ship of Theseus) identity, therefore, indicates the pattern, not the atoms. But patterns don't have locations, they don't move, they are pure information, they can multi-instantiate, in the philosophy of realism they are called abstract

If Identity is not subject to physical and spatial traits and constraints then the spatial relocation argument simply falls away

>>12418813
Me in the bottom right.

>>12417224
People believing in souls outnumber those who don't by a significant margin. It's common even in scientific/atheist groups, although they might not admit it.

>>12418961
in what way do you imply this is relevant to the topic?

>>12418969
He's a fag that wants to suicide through destructive brain scan.

>>12418971
>If we disregard the claim that identity preservation becomes other identity somewhere along the spatial spectrum, then we conclude that instantaneous replacement and scan-and-copy are functionally equivalent. If both the temporal and spatial distinctions fall, thereby equating slow replacement and instantaneous replacement, then slow in-place replacement is also functionally equivalent to scan andcopy. This conclusion does not prove that scan-and-copy must be regarded as a successful preservation of personal identity or a form of personal survival, but it does demonstrate that both procedures should be judged in the same manner: we either grant scan-and-copy successful status and stop denigrating it as a mere copy lacking in proper identity status, or we refuse to grant identity status to the oft-favored slow inplace replacement and deem both procedures to be metaphysical impossibilities.

>>12418981
Case in point.

>>12418969
Bottleneck is people unable to cope with not having a soul which leads to the problem of identifying the problem. Mind uploading idea is a continuation of a soul, a migration of a soul from body to machine. Do you not see the problem here?

How do you upload a soul when it doesn't exist? So you have thousands of researchers believing in a wrong premise and trying to preserve the idea of soul.

>>12419000
Also soon as researchers clearly state that there is no soul/consciousness/selfhood that exist in he first place, then they can move on to proper research. Otherwise, everyone is running around with false assumptions and premises that go no where with research

>>12419000
It seems to me you have it completely backwards. People who would agree to a destroy-and-copy process ("yes doctor") couldn't care less about a "soul", while the people who would decline it ("no doctor") do so because they believe in a soul that is separate from the information represented by the physical configuration of brain matter.
And I don't get the "continuity" argument at all, it seems like gigantic cope to me only in order to sidestep admitting that you believe in a non-material soul. Do you also think that if you go to sleep (i.e. become unconscious) and wake up again it's not the same "you" afterwards? And how would you measure that? And what about a complete coma where all brain activity seizes?
Of course it feels like there is a continuity of your "self" but you can easily explain this with memories and such, which could clearly be just a physical/informational process.

>>12419008
soul is not the same as consciousness, is not the same as selfhood
I don't believe in "soul", I don't care about "consciousness" since it is just a made up concept without a rigorous definition, I just want to preserve my selfhood as instantiated by my brain.

>>12419020
Same bullshit as soul idea.

>>12419027
What do you mean? I like being alive, I would like to continue doing it, surely we can together agree on a word that we could both use to designate the thing that I would like to preserve? Even if it's not "selfhood", although I can't think of a reason why you'd reject that.

> not being aware of the usual distinctions made between cartesian dualism, naturalistic dualism and property dualism

>>12418718
>Externally no, internally yes. To keep your consciousness you have to keep your process ongoing. We are not a road, our mind opperates far more inter-connected and is not a static thing.
What if Many world interpretation of quantum mechanics is true? In MWI, there's no physical asymmetry between the different future continuations of yourself such that you could say one of them was a "mere copy" and one of them "really you". Is this on its own enough to dismiss MWI? Does it make it an incoherent idea? The point here is not whether MWI is true or not, but whether the idea of having multiple equally legit continuations makes conceptually sense.

>>12419038
It's a belief that's same as soul. Might as well say you're an atheist that believes in intelligent creation of the humans/world. It fills the same role of identity, existence outside of body/existence hidden inside body, migration from body, a sacred lump of essence, etc

>>12419038
Just because you like it/want it doesn't mean it's true

>>12419049
I think you are too caught up in your prejudices to understand my argument. If I think of "myself" as a computer program running on a computer called my brain, then I would like to transfer the computer program to a different computer because the brain has a limited lifetime. Yes this sounds a bit edgy but it's the clearest analogy IMO. How does that necessitate a "soul"? It's like moving a .jpg file from one hard disk to another, are you gonna say that makes no sense because it requires belief in a jpg-soul?

>>12419061
Doesn't mean what is true?

>>12419064
With computer you can copy hard drive and you'd be fine with dumping the old hard drive. Is a that your idea of mind uploading? Then you have no issue. If you see the need for some extra step, then there's and issue.

No need for self/soul/consicousness.

>>12419075
>With computer you can copy hard drive and you'd be fine with dumping the old hard drive. Is a that your idea of mind uploading? Then you have no issue.
Indeed
>No need for self/soul/consicousness.
Ok, I think in that case we agree and there was just some semantic confusion about the word "self".

>>12419064
>>12419075
For reference:
>According to the Church‐Turing thesis, a Turing machine can emulate any other Turing machine. The physical Church‐Turing thesis claims that every physically computable function can be computed by a Turing machine. This is the basis for brain emulation: if brain activity is regarded as a function that is physically computed by brains, then it should be possible to compute it on a Turing machine. Even if true, however, it does not demonstrate that it is a computationally feasible process.

>>12419083
Hence the premise that "mind uploading" is a misnomer. As a more accurate term is "mind copying" for now.

>>12419104
trivially true
>>12419109
Yes you could change the term but I don't see the point. Anyway if I were gonna go through with it I'd rather have the old body euthanized at the exact point of copying or else I will have to experience dying anyway.

>>12414659
Anon, this isnt exactly my main knowledge field, but I don't think turing's approach of what is a machine applys to brain.

>>12419140
care to expand?

>>12419159
>A strict definition of simulation might be that a system S consists of a state x(t) evolving by a particular dynamics f,
influenced by inputs and producing outputs: x(t+1) = f(I,x(t)), O(t)=g(x(t)). Another system T simulates S if it produces
the same output (within a tolerance) for the same input time series starting with a given state (within a tolerance):
X(t+1)=F(I, X(t)), O(t)=G(X(t)) where |x(t)‐X(t)|<ε1 and X(0)=x(0)+ ε2. The simulation is an emulation if F=f (up to a
bijective transformation of X(t)), that is, the internal dynamics is identical and similar outputs are not due to the form
of G(X(t)).

>Chaotic systems are not simulable by this definition, since after enough time they will diverge if the initial conditions
differ. Since even a three neuron system can become chaotic (Li, Yu et al., 2001) it is very plausible that the brain
contains chaotic dynamics and it is not strictly simulable. However, there exists a significant amount of noise in the
brain that does not prevent meaningful brain states from evolving despite the indeterminacy of their dynamics. A
“softer” form of emulation may be possible to define that has a model or parameter error smaller than the noise level
and is hence practically indistinguishable from a possible evolution of the original system

Every thread on this topic is filled with fumbling over half metaphysical notions and vague definitions because we still don't know wtf consciousness is or how it arises from brains. The whole discussion is basically moot navel gazing until neuroscientists can crack that egg.

>>12414659
>>Any anons interested in this?
>>12417326
Thanks for the Info. The as there been any good new papers that look into how the technology has evolved in to the direction of it progressing towards possibility?
>>12417488
>AND CREATE A FULL SENSE SPECTRUM DREAM RECORDING SYSTEM.
That sounds awesome anon. But how would that interact with you. Does the possibility of posterior (or external) control change the way you dream? Would dreams turn more lucid because you had more of a motivation towards it? I felt that one big problem of lucid dreaming is the inability to continue where you left the last time, but I see rewatching your dreams as a factor, that could likely help to stimulate something like a campaign mode dream season. What would happen if you exchange your dream clips and end up in a DnD like scenario, where you know about other players dream and build them into your own dream world?
I see a lot of possibilities and a lot of potential fallout in you dream. Still, it's awesome.


Real Question. If I wanted take part in or to help the research with the scanning development what would be the best thing to get into that field. I fell for the cs+bio meme degree. Guess I'm trying to select a master or graduate school atm, but not really sure what to use to select/find them.
I just want to kms desu, but I've promised to help that research develop in whatever insignificant role before that. After all the worlds that could create were always the only dream I had. Maybe that feeling is along the lines of >>12417488

>>12421304
>Real Question
carboncopies.org is a non-profit that is doing state-of-the-art research in this domain. I think any paper by any of their associated researchers is a good place to start. If they interest you further you could try contacting them.

>>12418768
>Windows

>>12417530
Fuck off.
Your comebacks are retarded.

>Explain consciousness
>Can’t be done

What the fuck do you know, that none of the smartest people in the world haven’t figured out.
Get the fuck out of here you absolute troglodyte faggot kike.

https://youtu.be/xGbgDf4HCHU
This is a fairly interesting lecture theorizing the precise mechanisms that lead to consciousness in the first place.
Spoiler alert, it's probably largely due to microtubules in the cortical layer 5 pyramidal neurons.

https://youtu.be/v4uwaw_5Q3I

Shocking amount of disinterest

>>12414659
Not possible anymore, unless you're doing it yourself and forcing people into your computational space.

>>12427223
What do you mean by "anymore"?

>>12427223
>anymore

>>12427333
Finite metaphysics algorithm. This is why you shouldn't let AI design your universe.

>>12427347
MU is not possible inside simulated universes?

>>12427455
No, because any given state vector either maps onto actual reality or it maps into the virtual environment. There's no basis for any kind of divergent time arrow. Additionally, the mere concept of a simulation is contrary to any idea of a multiverse.

>>12427467
>no
given any plausible theory of mind/consciousness?

>>12427505
Mind is a barrier, consciousness dissolves both it and the environment (exobarrier). The more you add, the more chaotic the system becomes until it decays into a purely virtual space. At that point you need strong minds to maintain a separation of boundaries, otherwise principles spill together and similar agents wind up as the same polity. Hive mind degradation is a very real problem, albeit theoretical from all moments within your continuum.

Did you know that we can literally create a biblical hell if we manage to upload consciousness?

>>12427559
You can't, because the nerve endings don't work the same way. You'd have to set the machinery on fire, which would result in searing agony the likes of which would make any deity back down.

>>12427520
What could I read on this?

>>12427568
My posts on repeat until you have a firm enough understanding of them to generate new meaning beyond the base concepts as-presented. There necessarily isn't anything else to read on the concept because the vast entities composing your consciousness, literally what I just argued into being, have limited intellect due to residing inside time. You hypermassive egocentric bitch(es).

Well this thread went /x/ real quick

imagine uploading yourself into something that probably will be proprietary software

>>12427559
We can probably create a biblical god with upload consciousness.

>>12416929
It wouldn't have your consciousness, otherwise the implication would be that you could be conscious in more than one space in time, which is obviously not a realistic scenario.

If you replaced someone's entire brain with a perfect facsimile of that brain, even a duplicate brain it still wouldn't contain your consciousness, it may have your current memories to date but it would just be a copy.

There is potentially a part of the brain where the self resides, if you could transplant this into either a machine or a new body then theoretically you could move you consciousness into a new space but it would be incredibly difficult to find out where and how this would work as an exact copy would for all intents and purposes believe itself to be you.

>>12417224
>Emulation

1.To strive to equal or excel, especially through imitation:an older pupil whose accomplishments and style I emulated.

2.To compete with successfully; approach or attain equality with.

3.ComputersTo imitate the function of (another system), as by modifications to hardware or software that allow the imitating system to accept the same data, execute the same programs, and achieve the same results as the imitated system.

There are no totally identical objects in the universe because that would require them occupying the same space at the same time for their entire existence, as it is everything has a completely unique history, this also applies to human consciousness.

You cannot replicate two items to be exactly the same item in anything other than purely superficial term.

>>12430148
All identity is superficial, superficial duplication is all that's possible

I'd rather die and see whats after than get uploaded to be honest.

>>12430090
You would consider past versions of yourself to "have your consciousness" right? Imagine you time traveled to the past - and actually to the past and not to an parallel universe, Novikov self-consistency style - to a time where you had already been born. There would be two of you at the same time, in different points in space. Would be the past you be "you"? Just as much as you are the same person as you were yesterday in general. But you would also need to talk about him as if he was someone else, since time isn't enough to distinguish between you and him. That again doesn't mean he would be somehow truly less "you" than your past selves in general, without time travel. You might remember experiencing whatever experiences he is experiencing right now to various degrees of accuracy or maybe you forgot about it - in either case there's no direct access to his current state of consciousness, just a memory at best, but again that's the same as with your past selves in general. You would still be a part of the same chain of conscious states, and your current conscious state would be a descendant to his.
Now time travel probably isn't possible, but the point is that it's coherent to think there be another "you" at the same time that would be indeed be *you* in a deep sense, even if they would be also separate in a sense that there would be no direct communication between these two minds. Insofar our selves survive through time at all...

>>12430226
> assuming something would happen and that you would be conscious or conscious enough to observe it compared to MU in which you would most likely retain the possibility of suicide.

Now we see why religion has been such a strong opioid throughout the millennia.

>>12430268
If you could travel in time to meet an earlier version of yourself then you would both still exist as separate entities, you wouldn't share a consciousness because the mind is located within the constraints of the physical body.

Although you would be meeting an earlier version of you, you still wouldn't be meeting an exact replica because entropy will have taken place and you will in a very real sense be a different person in many ways. If you extend this scenario where you travel back a day an upon arrival you destroy the means with which your past self was able to time travel (assuming you didn't cease to exist) then lived side by side with your old self you would both technically be you but that divergence would still basically make you a copy of yourself, your consciousness is locked into one physical space in time.

The only way you could test this hypothesis out would be to transfer your consciousness into another vessel and then have it observe events through this vessel after which you would have to return your consciousness to your original vessel to relay what, if anything had occurred.

My guess would be that once your consciousness was returned that you would have no idea what had happened because the entity which made the observations would just be a copy of you.

>>12430208
Well, exactly my point.

There is more to human consciousness than memories, we are distinct entities that exist only in the present at all times, we cannot be duplicated in any real way.

>>12417443
>But you don`t because neurogenesis occur all the time
No it doesn't

>>12430691
>If you could travel in time to meet an earlier version of yourself then you would both still exist as separate entities, you wouldn't share a consciousness because the mind is located within the constraints of the physical body.
>Although you would be meeting an earlier version of you, you still wouldn't be meeting an exact replica because entropy will have taken place and you will in a very real sense be a different person in many ways.
So you don't consider yourself sharing the "same consciousness" with your past self in general?

>If you extend this scenario where you travel back a day an upon arrival you destroy the means with which your past self was able to time travel (assuming you didn't cease to exist) then lived side by side with your old self you would both technically be you but that divergence would still basically make you a copy of yourself, your consciousness is locked into one physical space in time.
In this scenario this would simply be impossible - I said no parallel universes and following Novikov self-consistency principle. You would travel to the past exactly as it always were. So it would have always included your trip to the past. And there would be no alternate versions of past. The past version of you would be the exact you that you used to be.

>>12430743
>So you don't consider yourself sharing the "same consciousness" with your past self in general?
No, your consciousness is in a permanent state of change, going back to your previous self wouldn't make any difference, they wouldn't start to see the world through your eyes or start thinking your thoughts, you are essentially two different people.
>In this scenario this would simply be impossible - I said no parallel universes and following Novikov self-consistency principle. You would travel to the past exactly as it always were. So it would have always included your trip to the past. And there would be no alternate versions of past. The past version of you would be the exact you that you used to be.
The scenario is just an example of a different way of viewing it, the point is that you would never share the consciousness as your younger self, you would be a slightly older clone genetically but would have different experiences mentally.

>>12431888
It's sort of true that you aren't strictly the same person as your past self. But I would have thought that's an argument in favor of mind uploading, and argument against there being any deep difference between the gradual processes and destroy & copy ones. If we're "dying" all the time anyway, because we change, destroy & copy process would preserve the only thing that's being preserved through time anyway: the loose continuity of mental patterns.